There has been too little analysis in Croatian academic and professional literature of the economic operations of domestic shipyards. The public impression has always been that shipbuilding is a strategic industry from which the country has enormous benefits. But the reality is just the oppositeCroatian shipbuilding is an example of an incinerator of public money. Since 1992, 30bn kuna of taxpayers' money has been sunk into its rehabilitation and restructuring. In this paper, accordingly
Introduction
Shipbuilding in Croatia has a long tradition. The favourable geographical location along the Adriatic coast was crucial for the foundation of today's yards, which in the middle of the 19 th and in the early 20 th century were established as part of the naval arsenal of the Kingdom of Dalmatia (an Austrian crown country within the Habsburg Monarchy and the Austro-Hungarian Empire). Then, the shipyards proved themselves successful in the construction of naval vessels, and during the years were increasingly oriented towards the construction of commercial vessels. Today the production lines of the biggest Croatian shipyards include all kinds of merchantmen, floating docks, cranes, special purpose ships and warships, including submarines and all kinds of vessels.
Two hundred and fifty nine firms are in operation in Croatia that build ships and boats. They have total sales of almost 2bn kuna and employ a labour force of almost 11,000 (table 1). Number of firms 259
Number of persons employed 10,944
Number of paid employees 10,710
Number of employ hour worked (in thousands of hours) 17,643
Main characteristics of operations (in million kuna) Sales
1,937
Value of production 1,999
Added value according to costs of production factors 440
Gross operating surplus/ deficit -669
Total procurements of goods and services 2,230
Personnel costs 1,108
Compensations and wages 712
Shipbuilding has always been an important industrial sector, especially along the coast, in Istarska, Primorsko-goranska and Splitsko-dalmatinska counties. A large number of small and medium sized enterprises are contractors to the shipping industry, and its export orientation additionally enhances the importance of this branch of industry.
The five biggest shipyards are Brodosplit, Brodotrogir, Uljanik, Viktor Lenac and 3. maj. These shipyards employ about eight thousand workers (table 2) . Although until a short time ago they were all state owned, by the end of 2013, all the big shipyards had been restructured and privatised. Viktor Lenac completed the restructuring and privatisation process in 1993 and is operating today in the same environment as shipyards that are still going through this process. For a better understanding of the consequences of restructuring and privatisation it has to be said that DIV became the owner of Brodosplit in early 2013. A few months after that, Kermas energija took over Brodotrogir. In mid-2014, Uljanik (privatised in 2012) took over 3. maj.
The revenues of the shipyards in 2011 and 2013 were greater by the mere fact that state aids and grants were recorded as revenues. By a reduction of the level of aids and grants, the revenues of the yards as well as their expenditures were reduced (table 4) . But state aids were the reason for the larger operating profits being made.
After 2012, the revenues of the shipyards fell drastically. In 2013, only Uljanik recorded a rise in overall revenues, but even this is only apparent, since revenues from sales did not rise, only financial revenues, which was actually the difference between the fair value of 3. maj and the market price, which came to about 560m kuna (revenues from favourable purchase). Total expenditures fell drastically after privatisation, thanks to rationalisation of costs, dismissals and reduction of high financial expenditures brought about by high interest. Thanks to the high reserves of Uljanik, total shipyard expenditures rose in 2014. In 2014 Brodotrogir and Viktor Lenac registered a very small profit, and the remaining yards made losses.
Revenues from sales of the biggest Croatian shipyards fell from 2011 to 2013, while in 2014 they rose to 2bn kuna (table 5) . Revenue from exports of the five biggest shipyards have been falling since 2011 (table 6 ). In the world order books, in 2015 Croatia occupied 10 th place (after China, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Romania, Vietnam, Brazil, Taiwan and the USA). China is at the top with 43% of the total market, then South Korea (29%) and Japan (21%). In 2015 Croatia accounted for about 0.23% of world production and in Europe accounted for 13% after Romania (57%), making it the second (Croatian Shipbuilding -Jadranbrod, 2015 In the last few years a considerable decline in production has been observed, the result of increased competition and of greater EU pressures for restructuring of the shipyards, and partially because of the poor market for ships. It became necessary to differentiate production and to get into new areas outside the building of ships. Thus classic shipbuilding began to slide in the shadow of offshore projects such as wind farms, dams and energy containers. It will be interesting to track the jobs that Croatian shipyards will carry out in the future. Judging from trends towards the diversification of production, the value of ships delivered could be a less important figure in the analysis of the operations of the big Croatian shipyards.
Expressed in compensated gross tonnage, the value of the ships delivered has significantly reduced (table 7) .
Bearing this in mind, it is a sensible decision of the shipyards gradually to tend towards nonshipbuilding production and to expand their market capacities. Privatisation was a logical path towards the strategic positioning of shipbuilding. The order book of Croatian shipyards shows that production measured according to CGT will rise in the coming period ( 
Compensated gross tonnage
Compensated gross tonnage -CGT -is the unit used to measure output in shipbuilding. It is based on gross tonnage (GT) or DWT (deadweight tonnage), adjusted with the use of compensating factors relative to the complexity of the ship relating to hull, engines and equipment in relation to the kind and size of the ship. The most recent formula for the calculation of CGT unit is: CGT = A x gt B , where A is the factor of the kind of ship, gt is the gross tonnage of the ship and B is the ship size factor (OECD, 2007 Attention has to be drawn to the absence of any orders made to Brodotrogir, which back in 2013 announced diversified operations, laying stress on ship servicing, maintenance and modifications, providing moorings at sea and dry dock facilities in the newly built marina the completion of which is expected in 2018. Brodotrogir obviously can hardly ensure continued operations by exclusive reliance on shipbuilding.
Costs of rehabilitation of the shipyards
Although the shipyards are in private hands today, from 1992 to 2012 the state put more than 28bn kuna into the rehabilitation of the shipyards -an average of about 1.4bn a year. And that is not all. From 2012 to 2017 it is planned to invest an extra 2.2bn kuna into the shipyards -0.44bn kuna a year -which after a lengthy period should ensure them financial stabilisation and operations as private corporations ( The first rehabilitation of the shipyards majority owned by the state in the amount of 3.3bn kuna was carried out from 1999 to 2001. The government wrote off its claims against the shipyards and partially replaced them by equity in the new ownership structure. The following shipyards were rehabilitated: Kraljevica (1999.), Uljanik, 3. maj, Brodosplit (2000) and Brodotrogir (2001) .
The second rehabilitation of the shipyards started in 2002 and by 2008 the government was supposed to provide 2.8bn kuna worth of aid. However, after the implementation of the rehabilitation of 2002, the government did not continue with the rehabilitation programme.
According to the Pre-Accession Economic Programme of 2004, the Government announced the privatisation of firstly just one and then of all the other shipyards by the end of 2004. This was not carried out, and the state just continued covering the losses of the shipyards.
In 2007, and much more so in 2010, a large part of state financial guarantees of the Republic of Croatia was issued to firms in the manufacturing sector, mostly for the debts of the shipyards. Since the shipyards were privatised and restructured, from 2012 the state had no need to issue guarantees for their borrowings. But after a pause of two years, in 2015 shipbuilding once again became an important beneficiary of state guarantees (table 10) . Between 1998 and 2015 12.5bn of state guarantees were called, the lion's share being accounted for by shipbuilding. The considerable reduction of shipyard liabilities after 2012 was the result of an administrative manoeuvre by which the government turned the shipyard debt of 9.35bn kuna into direct public debt, and some of the liabilities into equity in the shipyards (table 11) On the day the negotiations with the EU were closed (June 30, 2011), the Agency for the Protection of Market Competition and the EC accepted the plans for the restructuring of 3. maj, Kraljevica and Brodotrogir, after which it was possible to start negotiating the preparations for the privatisation contracts. From then until January 2012, the Government made no significant advance in the restructuring of the shipyards, because of which the planned costs of restructuring were increased by about one billion kuna. In order to speed up the procedure, finally, decisions were adopted and models for restructuring and privatisation were made for Uljanik, Brodotrogir , Brodosplit and 3. maj. In July 2012, the government started up bankruptcy proceedings in Kraljevica shipyard (Ministry of Economy, 2012).
In order to persuade the private sector to privatise the then heavily indebted shipyards, in 2012 the government assumed 9.35bn kuna of debt liabilities of the shipyards secured by state guarantees and transferred them to the debt of general government (table 9) . The manner in which privatisation was carried out is interesting, to say the least.
For in the 1990s, the state (as majority owner) made over to the shipyards the land on which they were sited. Since the shipyards on the whole carried out their activity in special purpose ports (shipbuilding ports) on the maritime domain, the state expanded the borders of the maritime domain. The reason for extending the coverage of maritime domain was the intention of the state, as owner, to carry out offsetting of reciprocal claims and debts (rights and liabilities) with the shipyards and write off their debts in exchange for restitution of the maritime domain (real property) on which the shipyards carried out their activities. In this way the state protected itself from the risk that the new purchasers in the privatisation progress might become owners of valuable real estate. With this process, property law issues worth about 8.2bn kuna (table 12) were settled. Table 12 Liabilities of shipyards compensated by exchange of assets on national maritime domain in 2011.
The shipyards had their liabilities written off and the condition for privatisation was completed. According to Article 36 Paragraph 1 of the Act of Accession, all liabilities that the Government had assumed in the restructuring of the shipyards (all the state aids that the enterprises had received from March 1, 2006) were considered restructuring aid. The contribution of entrepreneurs to the restructuring plan out of their own resources had to be real, without state aids, and had to come to at least 40% of total costs of restructuring. In the restructuring process compensatory measures were taken whereby Croatia guaranteed to reduce the total production capacity of the enterprises, from the 471,324 CGT of June 1 to 372,346. By permanently closing slipways and by reducing their areas the entrepreneurs had to reduce their production capacity at the latest twelve months after signing the privatisation agreement. The total annual production of entrepreneurs was restricted to 323,600 GGT (table  13) for a period of ten years, starting from January 1, 2011. Compensation measures were prescribed for the sake of neutralising the distorting effect of the aids given on the conditions of trade (market competition). The measures were prescribed so that Croatian shipbuilding (because of the fairly large amount of state aids received) should not be able to achieve a privileged position as against other European shipyards. Table 13 Restriction on annual shipyard production from 2011 to 2020 (in CGT)
The entrepreneurs were able to agree with the shipyards (whose production was curtailed) about the revision of individual restrictions on production, and on the basis of binding agreements to determine how much of their own individual production quota (in terms of CGT) they could make over to each other. In so doing they had to respect the total annual restriction of production to 323,600 CGT. Interestingly, not a single shipyard overstepped the maximally permitted annual amount of production (table 7) .
The restructuring plans also set forth a number of other measures that each entrepreneur had to implement to be able to ensure the long-term sustainability of its operations. The European Commission can still order the return to the state of all aids for rehabilitation and restructuring given to entrepreneurs from March 1, 2005, with compound interest, in the following cases:  if either the privatisation agreement was not signed or the conditions laid down in the plan of restructuring -accepted for the Agency for the Protection of Market Competition and the Commission -were not entirely put into it;  if an entrepreneur did not make a contribution of its own (exclusive of state aids) coming to at least 40% of the costs of restructuring;  if no reduction of total production capacity in the period of twelve months from the signing of the privatisation contract was made. In this case the return of aids was required from only those entrepreneurs who did not achieve the individual capacity reductions given in the table;  there was an overall overstepping of the production restrictions for the entrepreneurs (of the 323,600 CGT) in any individual calendar year between 2011 and 2020. In this case the return of the aim was sought from the entrepreneurs who had overstepped the individual production restrictions. A ban was implemented on the reception of any new aids for rehabilitation and restructuring before the elapse of at least ten years from the day the privatisation agreement was signed. Otherwise, the European Commission would order the government to ensure the return of all aids for rehabilitation and restructuring awarded in despite of the ban. Table 14 shows the dynamics of state aids and own contributions of shipyards, in line with the restructuring process. 
The impact of restructuring and privatisations on the operations of the shipyards
The impact of restructuring on employment and wages is analysed from the aspect of employee costs and total number of employed at the end of the business year (December 31) pursuant to the last available financial reports (table 15) .
The labour force in the big shipyards was reduced from 2011 to 2015 by about 2,700 or 25.5%. Encouragement can be found in the fact that average monthly wages rose in 2014 from 2013 by 5.5%, with the reduction of average net wages being recorded only in 3. maj. The number of employees was enlarged by 1.8%, the first increase in the number of jobs after 2010. Although it is not mentioned in the reports, in the last two years wages in the shipyards were not paid regularly, and there were several strikes in Brodosplit and 3. maj because of delayed wages and the imposition of more stringent conditions of labour.
In 2014 the large Croatian shipyards employed a labour force of 7,793, which is 0.6% of all employed persons, or 0.71% of all those employed in legal persons. The share of those employed in shipbuilding is gradually falling as the consequence of restructuring and the endeavours that the shipyards should become financially sound and independent of state aids. If the labour force in all the shipyards were considered (small, medium-sized and large) then their share in overall employment would come to from 2 to 5%, and with subcontractors to 10% (according to the data of Croatian Shipbuilding -Jadranbrod). 
* Figures according to the report of 2011 and according to the report of 2014 come to 117.6 million kuna
For a complete comprehension of the financial position one needs to look at the trends in shipyard liabilities during the restructuration and privatization (table 16 ). There are two interesting trends -a considerable reduction of long-term liabilities (because they were transformed into government debt) and the gradual rise in short-term liabilities.
The total liabilities of the shipyards after privatisation were radically reduced. After it had written off their debts, the state ceased giving guarantees. For this reason the shipyards were no longer able to obtain high long-term loans as they had before, and accordingly their longterm liabilities were reduced. In 2014 most of the liabilities of the shipyards were short-term liabilities (88%). They were reduced after privatisation, and then they increased slightly, which can be justified by increased business activity. Most of the short-term liabilities are those owed to suppliers and those related to advance payments received, which have to be met after the delivery of ships or the completion of some other business contracted for. The financial position of shipbuilding can be analysed in detail with the help of the relevant financial indicators -liquidity, assets and indebtedness, operating efficiency and financing as well as debt collection period and liability settlement period. The figures are tracked for four of the shipyards, which from 2011 to 2014 were in the process of restructuration and privatisation (Uljanik, 3. maj, Brodotrogir and Brodosplit).
From the point of view of liquidity, the position of Croatian shipyards is satisfactory (table 17) . All liquidity indicators in 2012, as expected, increased because the state had taken over their liabilities, and after that in 2013 they fell and then rose again in 2014. The liquidity of the shipyards is satisfactory, particularly if one looks at the coefficient of quick and current liquidity, the average values of which are 1.47 or 1.82 in 2014. The average is spoiled by Uljanik, for which the coefficients of quick and current liquidity are less than 1 and have been constantly on the decline since 2010, although a slight recovery was seen in 2014 (Appendix P.1). Viktor Lenac too has shown increasingly low liquidity since 2011. Asset turnover ratios show that the shipyards do not have a very big market share, in other words are short on revenues (table 18) . After 2012, all the shipyards have recorded a rise in the value of their assets that is not accompanied by a rise in revenues, because of high asset turnover ratios have been on the decline. The high ratios in 2011 and 2012 are on the whole the result of high state aids. The good side of restructuring is that the coefficient of indebtedness is within acceptable borders, but, with Uljanik and Brodotrogir, there are still above the 50% level that is considered the watershed between sound and unsound economic agents (Appendix P. 2). Viktor Lenac has recorded a growth in its asset turnover ratio since 2012, while its debt level has been constantly on the increase since 2008. Thus in 2014 for the first time the borrowing ratio was greater than 50%. If we take into consideration that the average borrowing ratio in 2010 was 3, and in 2014 was 0.62, and also that the value of state aids in 2013 and 2014 fell drastically after the write-off of liabilities of 2012, the question arises why so long was waited for privatisation.
Had it been done much earlier, the compensation measures imposed by the EU (because of high state aids) to the shipbuilding section would have been avoided. In the claim turnover ratio total short-term claims are reduced by short-term claims from the government in order to obtain a figure for the duration of the collection of claims from customers and associated companies that is relevant for the shipyards have large claims against the state that could be brought down to faulty conclusions. Only revenues from sales are looked at (without revenues from the state). In the case of the liability turnover ratio all expenditures and short-term liabilities are included (table 19) .
In 2014, Brodospolit and 3. maj had problems with collection (Appendix P.3). Interestingly, in 2014, 3. maj experienced a considerable increase in the collection period from associated firms, while Uljanik recorded a significant rise in the payment of liabilities. Since these firms are connected, we can conclude that Uljanik was late in paying its liabilities to 3. may. On the whole shipyards do not have problems collecting claims from customers, except from Brodosplit and 3. maj. In 2014, for example, it took Brodosplit an average of 320 days to collect from customers, and 3. maj 285 days. Also perceptible is an increase in the payment period for all shipyards after 2012. But it still took much less time for the shipyards to pay their obligations than in the days before privatisation. The indicators of overall operations efficiency and operations and sales efficiency are almost the same after the considerable cuts in state aids and grants. According to the profits and loss accounts, the financial activities of the shipyards are almost negligible as compared with their business activity, which can be expected from their great orientation to production. The efficiency of overall operations and sales in 2014 is worryingly lower than 1 which shows that expenditures exceed revenue. In 2013 all were bordering on 1 apart from Brodosplit that kept up the average. However, even this needs taking with caution, for in the revenues for 2013 Brodosplit showed all the future aids that it was supposed to receive from the state by 2017, thus speciously increasing its revenues (Appendix P.4). The gross profit margin up to 2014 is positive, while in 2014 because of the losses of all the yards (except for Brodotrogir) it is in negative area. It should be said that the financial reports of Brodotrogir are not transparent and inconsistent, for in the financial reports for 2013/2014 short-term liabilities of the group are shown different in two different places (p. 12 and p. 47).
Conclusion
Shipbuilding in Croatia has long been perceived as one of the chief branches of industry because of the large number of employees, its export orientation and the large number of subcontractors involved indirectly or directly in the production of ships. With EU accession, the Government started insisting on restructuring and privatising the shipyards. In the rehabilitation and restructuring of the yards, 30 bn kuna were invested. This fact reveals the true picture of the operations of Croatian shipyards, which were not up to the challenges of the market and were able to exist only by becoming a burden on the government budget. The reasons why the operations of the shipyards were not self-sustaining are not at issue here, but in further research the operations of their subcontractors should certainly be analysed more comprehensively.
As a result of the progress of restructuring, the shipyards have considerable reduced their labour force, and production too has fallen, not only because of restructuring but also because of the weak condition of the shipbuilding market, and also the compensation measures by which Croatia bound itself to reduce total production capacity by 471,324 to 372,346 CGT. The revenues from sales and exports of the five biggest shipyards are falling, and the decision for the shipyards to gradually orient their efforts to non-shipbuilding product seems sound.
In the financial operations of the shipyards there are two interesting trends -a considerable reduction of long-term liabilities (because they were turned into government debt) and a gradual rise in short-term liabilitie s. After it had written off their debt, the state stopped issuing guarantees. For this reason the shipyards did not manage to take out many long-term debts, as they had earlier. Most of the short-term liabilities refer to debts to suppliers and obligations for advance payments received that have to be met after the delivery of ships or after the completion of some other job agreed on.
The liquidity position of the Croatian shipyards is satisfactory. All liquidity ratios in 2012 as expected rose because their debts had been taken over by the state. The asset turnover ratios however show that the shipyards are in want of a major market share, in other words of revenues. The coefficient of indebtedness after the restructuring of the shipyards is on the whole within acceptable boundaries. But in the case of Uljanik and Brodotrogir it is still over the 50% that is considered the watershed between sound and unsound business entities. The efficiency of overall operations and sales in 2014 was worryingly below 1, which shows that expenditures outweigh revenue. In 2013 it was only Brodosplit that to an extent improved this fairly unpropitious picture, but even this has to be taken with caution for in its revenues for 2013 Brodosplit showed all future aids that it was supposed to get from the state up to 2017.
The effects of the restructuration and privatisation of the shipyards are nevertheless positive, and it is a question why these processes were not started earlier, which would have created savings in the budget and might have enabled the yards to avoid the compensation measures that the EU insisted on to reduce production. The consequences of the restructuring and rehabilitation of shipbuilding will have long-term impacts on public finances. If one takes into consideration that the budget of general government is in deficit, then it can be concluded that grants to shipbuilding were largely debt-financed. In other words, the about 30bn of public debt was created as a consequence of the restructuring and rehabilitation of shipbuilding, and if one takes into account the growing expenditures on interest that has to be paid on this debt, the full impact is much greater. 
Fiscus
Fiscus is an analytical serial publication of the Institute of Public Finance. It aims at analyzing current economic issues that affect the stability of public finances or are related to the production of goods and the provision of services of broader public interest. The topics concerned have not received adequate attention in the academic and professional community and relate to economic sectors in which the public interest is concerned, directly or indirectly. On scientific and professsional foundations, Fiscus seeks to empower and encourage public debate on the establishment and preservation of the stability of Croatian public finances and the economy in general by promoting transparent, prudent and responsible management. Therefore, the topics focus on the identification and quantification of potential risks that could threaten the stability of public finance, market development, the competitiveness of the Croatian economy and the economic position of the citizens.
The vision of Fiscus is to become a reliable source of sectoral analyses through the prism of interaction between the public and private sector.
The mission of Fiscus is to identify the key challenges faced by certain economic sectors and offer suggestions for the improvement and preservation of the long-term stability of the Croatian economy.
The main objectives are:
• to provide in-depth analysis of the financial operations of public sector institutions and those institutions that are in any way associated with the production of goods and the provision of services of a broader public interest; • to improve understanding of the financial consequences of their operations and increase accountability; • to provide objective information on their business operations to the broader professional public and to investors; • to contribute to the removal of administrative barriers to the development of competetiveness and the market economy.
